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Article text: 
In this extended article, Emile Chabal and Stephan Malinowski reflect on the use of 
history in the debate on UK’s relationship with Europe and question two historical 
narratives put forward about Britain – that its history has been uniquely continuous 
and that is has been exceptional. They suggest that Britain has been marked not by 
the continuity of its history but by the stability of its elites. They also argue that its 
imperial legacy, among other factors, makes Britain more like other European 
countries than not. 
For all the post-election hubris amongst Conservative MPs, the fact remains that 
Britain is in a period of profound political crisis. Not since the Northern Irish 
‘Troubles’ of the 1970s and 1980s has the country faced such a fundamental threat 
to its integrity and its place in the world. This threat has come from two closely-
linked processes. The first is a resurgent Scottish nationalism. The referendum on 
Scottish independence in 2014 was a hard-fought battle and, although the Union 
was preserved by a narrow margin, this did not prevent the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) from obliterating its Labour opposition in the recent general election. For the 
foreseeable future, both major political parties in the UK will have to contend with 
the ominous spectre of Scottish nationalism. 
The second process that has shaken the foundation of British politics is 
Euroscepticism. The inexorable rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP), which received 3.8 million votes (12.6%) in the May general election, has 
confirmed the popular roots of Euroscepticism. With the very real prospect of a 
referendum on EU membership in 2016, there has never been a more heated debate 
about the future of Britain’s place in Europe. And, as is so often the case where 
national identities and collective memories are at stake, historians have been called 
into action. Just as German historians were at the forefront of debates over the 
origins and uniqueness of the Holocaust in the late 1980s, or as French historians 
mobilised themselves for or against the French state’s lois mémorielles (‘memory 
laws’) in the mid-2000s, British historians are now engaged in a veritable culture 
war over Britain’s past. 
Historians for Britain 
One of the most striking manifestations of this culture war is the recent creation of 
an entity called Historians for Britain. The original impetus for this organisation was 
a letter to The Times in 2013 that called for a renegotiation of Britain’s relationship 
with the European Union. It was signed by 22 well-known British historians, but did 
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not receive a great deal of attention at the time. Hence, perhaps, the reason why 
these same historians felt the need both to create a more coherent organisation in 
2014 and to seek funding from the anti-EU business organisation, Business for 
Britain. With an election that reaffirmed the importance of Europe, the members of 
the organisation obviously felt the time was right for a new intervention on the 
subject. 
The result was an article by the widely-respected historian of the Mediterranean 
David Abulafia, boldly entitled ‘Britain: apart from or a part of Europe?’, published 
online in early May 2015 in the popular history journal History Today. The text of 
the manifesto, placed under an oversized photo of Allied officers planning the 
bombardment of Nazi Germany in 1944, plainly restated the Eurosceptic ideology 
that lies at the heart of the Historians for Britain campaign, namely that 
‘renegotiation [of Britain’s relationship] has to include a commitment by the EU 
itself to reform its ways and, at the very least, to leave those countries that do not 
seek to be part of a “United States of Europe” free to rely upon their own sovereign 
institutions without interference’. If the piece had been limited to this rather 
unremarkable argument, it would probably have sunk without trace. But this was 
not merely another opinion piece on Europe; it was intended as a historical narrative 
of British exceptionalism. Or, as Abulafia and his colleagues put it, ‘we aim to show 
how the United Kingdom has developed in a distinctive way by comparison with its 
continental neighbours’. 
To this end, the piece developed three historical arguments to explain why Britain 
stands apart from the European community. First, the authors suggested that 
Britain experienced a ‘degree of continuity […] unparalleled in continental Europe’, 
which comes from ‘principles of political conduct that have their roots in the 13th 
century or earlier’ and ‘ancient institutions’ such as the UK Parliament and British 
universities. Second, the authors maintained that Britain has been spared ‘the 
intense nationalism that has consumed many European countries’, that the ‘British 
political temper has been milder than in the larger European countries’ and that 
Britain was virtually untouched by the great ideologies of the twentieth century 
(‘Fascism… anti-Semitism… Communism’). Finally, the authors gave their 
argument for British exceptionalism a global twist by suggesting that, because 
‘Britain… ruled over vast tracts of the globe very far from Europe’ for much of its 
recent history, its future equally lies beyond the shores of Europe. Taken together, 
these three characteristics were said to ‘reflect the distinctive character of the 
United Kingdom, rooted in its largely uninterrupted history since the Middle Ages’. 
Unlike in 2013, the reaction this time was instantaneous. An open letter to History 
Today – signed by over 250 historians – denounced the historical inaccuracies and 
elisions in Abulafia’s piece. Another group of historians announced the creation of 
an online counter-group called Historians for History. Even the national press 
picked up on the controversy in a series of articles and editorials. But, while many of 
these attacks on the Historians for Britain manifesto have (rightly) focused their 
attention on correcting the numerous errors and simplifications in the text, there is 
a strong case to be made for unpacking, not simply the details of the manifesto, but 
also its underlying assumptions – none of which can be understood in isolation 
from the British experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In particular, 
we would like to draw attention to two assumptions that reveal a good deal about 
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the way British history is taught and disseminated: first, a myth of continuity and 
stability; and, second, the celebration of British exceptionality. 
A myth of British continuity 
One of the most powerful assumptions in the manifesto is a myth of continuity – 
the argument that Britain has an ‘uninterrupted history’. For the modern period, 
this view appears to have a grain of truth. Since the late eighteenth century, the 
absence of a major political revolution or any experience of occupation places 
Britain in a category of its own. Even where Britain has intervened militarily, it has 
done so in foreign lands. Battles at Mafeking, Ypres or Gallipoli did not directly 
affect those who remained at home. And the British never had to endure the 
humiliation and soul-searching of those societies confronted with the revolutionary 
anger of the Jacobins, the reinvention of elites by Napoleon, the purges of the 
Bolshevik regime, or the racially-driven zeal of the Nazis. To this extent, the 
Historians for Britain are correct that Britain has followed an unusually stable path 
to the twenty-first century. 
Nevertheless, even the most cursory examination of British history reveals that, for 
the vast majority of the population of the British Isles and the British Empire, there 
has been little meaningful continuity. Whether it was the dislocation of indigenous 
societies in Australia or India, or the experiences of Britain’s working-classes, the 
modern period has been one of rupture and deep transformation. The Industrial 
Revolution, for instance, transformed British society beyond all recognition, 
introducing new systems of management, governance and socio-spatial 
organisation that had far-reaching effects. For those working-class communities 
whose towns and cities experienced industrialisation in the nineteenth century and, 
in many cases, de-industrialisation in the twentieth century, a story of continuity 
rings hollow. The writings of Charles Dickens and Friedrich Engels – to name but a 
few – are a testimony to the profound social conflicts and inequalities that 
accompanied the growth of capitalism in Britain. 
But if such violent discontinuities were self-evident to contemporary observers and 
generations of subsequent historians, how is it that the Historians for Britain can so 
easily celebrate Britain’s supposedly ‘uninterrupted’ history? The answer lies in the 
remarkable stability of the British elite in the modern age. Through institutions like 
Eton and Oxford, and a peculiarly cohesive system of elite patronage in the City and 
across the British Empire, the British ruling classes successfully maintained their 
cohesion where others did not. Germany’s elites were transformed by the rise of 
Nazism and the creation of the GDR; France’s elites suffered repeated exile, 
persecution and purges from the French Revolution through Vichy and Algeria; and 
both Nazism and Communism wreaked havoc with the intellectual, political and 
cultural elites of Eastern European societies. The British elites never experienced the 
equivalent of the Katyn Massacre in 1940; they have rarely feared for their lives. 
The remarkable ability of the British elite to maintain itself and its institutions has 
both enhanced a narrative of continuity and rendered critique inaudible. The 
perpetuation of ‘tradition’, whether in the dining halls of Oxbridge colleges or the 
House of Lords, is widely celebrated in the UK but does not receive nearly the same 
critical attention as elsewhere. There is no equivalent, for example, of Pierre 
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Bourdieu’s withering attack on France’s higher educational institutions in his 
sociological writings, or the shelves of popular books on how Ivy League universities 
have strangled the American elite. Paradoxically, the enthusiasm with which British 
Eurosceptics denounce ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ has protected the British elite. For all 
their far-right credentials, UKIP are a long way behind, say, the French Front 
National, which perpetually denounces the énarchie and the incestuous world of the 
grandes écoles. 
This means that what lies at the heart of the Historians for Britain manifesto – and 
British Euroscepticism more generally – is not actually a grand story of national 
continuity and stability, but a much narrower one of elite reproduction. Over time, 
this has fuelled a myth of continuity in British political culture that has been 
reinforced by the sheer longevity of certain institutions. But longevity does not 
mean stability. It is quite obvious that the UK Parliament, the position of the 
monarch, the power of the media, the way universities work, the role of banks, or 
the training of lawyers and judges today is hardly the same as it was in the age of 
Pitt the Younger. For sure, a remarkable number of the British elite – from David 
Cameron downwards – have attended educational institutions that have existed for 
centuries, but this kind of continuity is hardly representative of British history as a 
whole. Whatever the Historians for Britain might say, Britain is not – and never has 
been – as stable as it appears. 
Splendid isolation or European engagement? 
The ease with which the British elites have subscribed to a narrative of continuity 
has reinforced the second major assumption that underpins the Historians for 
Britain manifesto, namely a story of British exceptionality. One might justifiably 
argue that all nations present themselves as exceptional. Germans have imagined 
their Sonderweg, the French have been told that their origins lie in an all-
conquering Republic, Poles have seen themselves as the ‘Christ of Nations’, and Irish 
self-perceptions claim the country can be compared to no other. But the Historians 
for Britain go one step further. They argue that British exceptionality means that 
Britain is much less European than we think. Or, to use the exact words of their 
manifesto, that ‘the United Kingdom has always been a partner of Europe without 
being a full participant in it’. 
Such a claim has been largely disproved by several generations of historical 
scholarship but the fact that it can be so easily reproduced by a group of high-level 
historians shows the extent to which it remains embedded in a British way of 
understanding history. At a very general level, the banal use of the term ‘the 
Continent’ to describe everything on the other side of the English Channel reflects 
this inability to place Britain in its European context. Within higher education more 
specifically, ‘British history’ is still almost always taught as a discrete subject, in 
contrast to ‘European’, ‘world’, or even (at Oxford) ‘general’ history. In the cases 
where ‘imperial’ history is added to a standard course on British history, it is always 
the history of the British Empire. And there remains a heated debate about how – if 
at all – histories of Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Ireland should be 
integrated into British history. 
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This parochialism has been exacerbated in recent years by the global pre-eminence 
of English-language scholarship and the steep decline in language skills amongst 
British school students. It is difficult today to find a group of students large enough 
to teach a course that involves French, and virtually impossible to find any British 
students at top universities who can at least read some German, Spanish, Italian or 
Portuguese. At postgraduate level as well, language training has been scrapped. 
While most US and European universities still expect PhD students to train in at 
least one foreign language, this is a rarity in the UK. As time goes on, these failures 
in language education – especially marked in comparison to other northern 
European countries – have encouraged a tendency towards British exceptionalism. 
There was nothing inevitable about this process. For some time now, British 
universities have employed exceptionally large numbers of European and non-
European academics. There is also a vibrant tradition of British historians writing 
about Europe. Indeed, the list of ‘supporters’ of the Historians for Britain group 
includes many historians who have written outstanding work on European history. 
But the group’s manifesto shows how little this scholarship has translated into an 
understanding of Britain’s place within Europe. Just a few examples, amongst many 
others, shed light on the extent to which British history is inseparable from 
European history in the modern period. 
Certainly the most surprising – and shocking – omission from the Historians for 
Britain manifesto is the history of British imperialism. The claim that Britain’s 
global reach since the 18th century makes Britain less European is positively bizarre. 
Did French rule over Martinique and New Caledonia, Belgian rule over the Congo, 
Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, or Portuguese rule over Angola make these 
countries less European? On the contrary, empire increasingly bound European 
nation-states together in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to such an extent 
that decolonisation became a defining feature of European history. An empire built 
on racist foundations, centuries of ruthless exploitation of human and natural 
resources, the forced resettlement of entire peoples and decades of colonial wars 
against ‘insurgents’ and independence movements characterise British history no 
less than European history. 
In fact, one could argue that violence has been an integral part of modern British 
history. Historians of Ireland, India and Kenya have repeatedly argued the 
devastating effects of British imperialism, and there is now a blossoming literature 
on comparative colonial violence and genocide. Unfortunately, as the ongoing 
success of Niall Ferguson’s neo-imperialist historical writing indicates, this has had 
little impact on British public life. In France, the violent legacies of empire and 
decolonisation have been in the news since the 1990s, with angry debates over 
torture during the Algerian War and France’s ‘guilt’ over slavery. But the British 
partitions of Ireland, Palestine and India, and the decolonisation of Malaya, have not 
received the same degree of public scrutiny, except in the form of imperial 
nostalgia. This is all the more surprising when one considers that, between 1945 
and 1992, Britain was involved in more wars than any other nation (18 of them, 
ahead of India (16) and the United States (12)). This hardly speaks of a congenitally 
‘mild’ political disposition. 
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The Historians for Britain are right that the UK did not succumb to Fascism, even if 
its elites openly flirted with it in the 1930s. They are also right that British 
Communism was a negligible political force, even if some of the most gifted 
postwar British historians (including Eric Hobsbawm and E.P. Thompson) emerged 
from the Communist Party Historians Group in the 1950s. But none of this is 
enough to make Britain exceptionally ‘mild’. The rise of capitalism and the 
Industrial Revolution wreaked havoc with community, social and family structures in 
the nineteenth century and became a symbol of the violence of economic change. It 
was also an integral part of a Europe-wide process. Britain’s merchant and trading 
classes were extremely good at profiting from the country’s maritime links – and 
perhaps it is still this desire to retain the ‘benefits’ of Europe without incurring the 
costs that drives contemporary British Euroscepticism. But even this trait is hardly 
unusual: the Swiss, too, learnt to profit from the misfortune of their neighbours in 
the twentieth century. In terms of economic development, Britain’s story is 
domestic, European and global all at once. 
The insights of modern cultural history, too, suggest that there is nothing 
exceptional about Britain. Intellectual movements like the Enlightenment, 
Romanticism and Modernism swept across Europe, taking on specific forms in 
different corners of the continent. And the boom in postwar tourism has taken 
millions of British people to Spain, Italy, Greece and France. It is enough to know 
that every European teenager in the 1960s was listening to the Beatles and that all 
British supermarkets today carry olive oil to see clearly how the histories of Britain 
and the rest of Europe are interwoven. This should be self-evident even to the most 
ardent Eurosceptic: after all, Britain’s most potent symbol of ‘uninterrupted history’ 
– the royal family – had to change its name from ‘Saxe-Coburg-Gotha’ to 
‘Windsor’ in 1917 in order to conceal its European origins! 
None of this is supposed to imply that Britain does not have its own particular 
history; like all communities, the British have told themselves certain stories about 
their place in the world. But the Eurosceptic and nationalist vision of the Historians 
for Britain is one that is at odds with innovative historical scholarship that has 
embraced the global and transnational turn, and generations of British and non-
British historical scholarship that instinctively places Britain within its European 
context. In advance of a referendum that will determine the future of the UK, the 
very least the British people can expect is a historical debate that draws on 
contemporary scholarship to make a nuanced case for (or against) Britain’s 
European destiny. Unfortunately, the Historians for Britain manifesto is an object 
lesson in historical irresponsibility, both in its attempt to twist history for political 
goals and in its inability to see beyond national myths. 
This article was originally published on Books&Ideas.net and is reproduced with 
permission. 
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